Bunge, Mario (1979). Philosophical inputs and outputs of technology.
In the introduction to his essay, Bunge asserts his thesis that technology “has a philosophical input and a philosophical output and, moreover, part of the latter controls the former.” In his elaboration of this claim, he implies three conditions must be met to prove an activity or discipline is philosophical: 1) the activity must exhibit some traits associated with philosophy, e.g. the assumption that reality can be known and altered “through experience and reason,” 2) the discipline must include use of theories that are relevant to philosophy, and 3) that some claim regarding the discipline’s approach to ethics (or morality) must be possible. Bunge’s discussion in his introduction also notes how technology’s relationship to philosophy is similar to and different from the relationship of science to philosophy and asserts that the existence of this relationship to philosophy itself is substantial enough to prove that technology is a legitimate discipline in itself and that is warrants “a fully developed philosophy” to accompany it, a philosophy distinct from the philosophy of science, a philosophy that would establish technology as a “major organ of contemporary culture,” much like science (Bunge, 1979/2014, chapter 17, section: introduction, para. 1-2). In the remainder of his essay, Bunge proposes a view of the problems of (or questions to be answered by) a philosophy of technology, a definition of technology that includes explication of its relationship to science and of its distinct research and development and production components, an epistemology of technology, a metaphysics of technology, a statement on the values of technology, and an ethics of technology.
Bunge delineates science from technology by focusing on “knowledge” and “change.” Whereas science performs research (or changes things) in order to gain knowledge, technology applies knowledge in order to incite change. (Bunge, 1979/2014, chapter 17, section: Branches of contemporary technology, para 1). In other words, he says, while the research of both science and technology pursue specific objectives, those objectives are different in that science pursues research in order to know the truth, while technology performs research in order to discover truth that can be applied to some other aim. Even though, according to Bunge, science and technology are methodologically similar (both pursuing specific aims), they are purposefully different (pursing different aims). He clarifies his view on how the epistemology of technology differs from that of science by noting it is driven by practical result and a looser definition of truth than science (Bunge, 1979/2014, chapter 17, section: The epistemology of technology).
Bunge’s “Flow Diagram of Technological Process” describes how science and technology operate in unison, to a certain degree, by both serving as an input function and an output function for each other – that is, scientific knowledge can be applied in technological research to create a product and that product can then become an object or a tool of scientific research. Bunge’s assertion that technology consists not only of the technologies it produces, but also of all its contextual processes is an important aspect of Bunge’s view of technology, which could be considered expansive since it involves not only the research and development processes and the production process, but also the management planning and decision-making processes, and perhaps by implication, the governmental or political processes that also partly determine the direction of technology (Bunge, 1979/2014, chapter 17, section: Technological research and policy).
Ellul, Jacques. (1954). On the aims of a philosophy of technology.
This essay is a collection of prefaces Ellul wrote for his book The Technological Society and together they provide an overview of his stated purpose in writing the book, a definition of technology or “technique,” summaries of his perspectives on a few key concepts, his reply to the apparent reaction to his book, and his general opinion of the ideas of a few other authors approaching the same subject.
I think it worth mention that although Ellul states his aim is to describe, analyze, and interpret “technique” (Ellul, 1954/2014, chapter 19, section: Author’s Preface to the French edition of The Technological Society [1954], para. 5) or only to know the truth, he finishes his essay with “a call to the sleeper to awake” (Ellul, 1954/2014, chapter 19, section: Author’s Foreword to the revised American edition [1964], para. 2, 17).
My impression is that at least in this essay, the primary aim of Ellul is to persuade the audience not only of the validity of his interpretation of “the technological society,” but also to encourage the audience to assert its freedom as he has defined that freedom, that is as a conscious act to disrupt the natural, evolutionary course of events – a conscious act Ellul obviously espouses. It is only through asserting agency that humans create their freedom (Ellul, 1954/2014, chapter 19, section: Author’s Foreword to the revised American edition [1964], para. 15-16).
Ellul’s definition of “technique” is an expansive one not limited to describing technological artifacts such as machines, nor to elaborating processes or methods surrounding the conception, creation, production, and use of those machines. Ellul defines technique as the “totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given state of development) in every field of human activity.” The aggregate of these rational and efficient methods in all areas of life are to Ellul a “sociological phenomenon” (Ellul, 1954/2014, chapter 19, section: Notes to the reader [1963], para. 2, 5), a “technological civilization,” and a “system of technical necessity” (Ellul, 1954/2014, chapter 19, section: Author’s Foreword to the revised American edition [1964], para. 5, 11).
Much of Ellul’s essay explains that even though his view of society – not only technological society, but also previous iterations of society (e.g. hunter-gatherer society) – is rightly perceived as essentially deterministic (Ellul, 1954/2014, chapter 19, section: Author’s Foreword to the revised American edition [1964], para. 5), he concedes determinism in aggregate does not preclude individual freedom and the capability of free individuals or of free groups of individuals to disrupt his projection of the probable evolution of the technological society to greater degrees of determinism (Ellul, 1954/2014, chapter 19, section: Author’s Foreword to the revised American edition [1964], para. 13-17).
The audience’s reaction to Ellul’s essays seems to have been negative, with a predominant claim that Ellul is a pessimist. Ellul denies his view is pessimistic. Rather, he claims that both his assessment of technological society and his prediction of its natural evolution are objective enough and accurate enough to warrant acceptance — and to catalyze individual assertion of freedom over systemic determinism (Ellul, 1954/2014, chapter 19, section: Author’s Foreword to the revised American edition [1964], para. 2, 6).
Shrader-Frechette, Kristin. (1992). Technology and ethics.
In this essay, Shrader-Frechette argues a multidisciplinary approach is required in order for those who analyze, deliberate, determine, and manage the development, introduction, and adoption of technology to attain optimal results — and she provides an overview of what she considers to be the five primary components of such an approach (Shrader-Frechette, 1992/2003, chapter 17, section: introduction, para. 1-5).
Her focus on the practical aspects of technology is evident in her definition of technology as “knowledge associated with the industrial arts, applied sciences, and various forms of engineering” and in her references to what it is “within one’s power to do” and to “new possibilities for action” (Shrader-Frechette, 1992/2003, chapter 17, section: introduction, para. 1). At the same time, she clearly suggests those she believes who would be best positioned to determine the course of technological development and adoption would possess an integrated perspective, perhaps technocrats, techno-rhetoricians, or some other hybrid professional with knowledge spanning at least philosophy (including ethics), science, and economics (Shrader-Frechette, 1992/2003, chapter 17, section: introduction, para. 1).
I said Shrader-Frechette describes five components of the framework for analysis, deliberation, and action she explains, but she calls them five categories into which “philosophical questions about technology and ethics generally fall” (Shrader-Frechette, 1992/2003, chapter 17, section: introduction, para. 5). The remainder of the essay is divided into five sections aligned with those questions, or topics; and throughout these five sections, Shrader-Frechette introduces her view of the main concepts, and predominant perspectives on those concepts, that commonly arise when deliberating on matters concerning technology and ethics.
Jonas, Hans. (1979). Toward a philosophy of technology.
Rather than ask whether technology warrants philosophical attention, Jonas asks how it could not, given that technology informs all aspects of human life, including the “material, mental, and physical” (Jonas, 1979/2014, chapter 20, section: introduction, para. 1). Structuring his essay in three parts, Jonas provides an extended definition of technology in the first two parts, while in the third part he addresses technology’s ethical dimension.
The first part of Jonas’ essay discusses what he calls “the formal dynamics of technology as a continuing collective enterprise” (Jonas, 1979/2014, chapter 20, section: introduction, para. 3) which he divides into two eras, the era of “modern technology” and the era that preceded it. My impression is Jonas distinguishes between these eras by describing the eras’ characteristics in relation to the concrete variable duration in time and in relation to some abstract variables such as a) catalysts, b) resolutions, c) ends and means, and d) progress. Due to the different relationships of the eras’ characteristics with these different variables, Jonas states the primary difference between earlier technology and later technology is “that modern technology is an enterprise and a process, whereas earlier technology was a possession and a state” (Jonas, 1979/2014, chapter 20, part: I The formal dynamics of technology, section 1: introduction, para. 1).
Jonas describes the time-frame for significant advancement in the pre-modern technological era as one in which the “pace was so slow that only in the time-contraction of historical retrospect” do those advancements seem revolutionary. Regarding the catalysts of technological innovation, Jonas argues that revolutionary change in the pre-modern technological era was essentially unintentional and happened “more by accident than by design.” In the pre-modern era, according to Jonas, the resolution of technological advances (e.g. establishment of a given set of tools or procedures) was a “stable equilibrium of ends and means” representing “an unchallenged optimum of technical competence” or “point of technological saturation.” In general, it seems to me Jonas is describing a state in which at least the established powers accept that the available technological means are optimal for sustaining their ends. When this situation arises, vested interests become conservative and disinclined toward potentially risky technological innovation. Regarding progress, Jonas asserts that in the pre-modern technological era, humans did not presuppose a future of “constant progress” and did not possess a “deliberate method” of formal research which could produce theoretical knowledge and which could have as its ultimate end practical application – this came later with the refinement of scientific disciplines and with the support of these disciplines by societal institutions (Jonas, 1979/2014, chapter 20, part: I The formal dynamics of technology, section: introduction, para. 1-3).
Unlike the timeframe for significant advancement in the pre-modern technological era, the time-frame in the modern technological era is a rapid one, one in which technological innovations “spread quickly through the technological world community, as also do theoretical discoveries in the sciences” (Jonas, 1979/2014, chapter 20, part: I The formal dynamics of technology, section: Traits of modern technology, para. 1). Continuing his contrast of advancement in the modern technological era with advancement in the traditional era, Jonas describes the catalysts in the modern technological era primarily as phenomena of modern technology’s “enterprise and process” (Jonas, 1979/2014, chapter 20, part: I The formal dynamics of technology, section: introduction, para. 1) which he also states expresses its “dialectics or circularity.” In other words, in the modern technological era, Jonas argues the technological-industrial-mercantile system itself “may suggest, create, even impose new ends, never before conceived, simply by offering their feasibility” (Jonas, 1979/2014, chapter 20, part: I The formal dynamics of technology, section: Traits of modern technology, para. 1). Although it seems to me Jonas to a certain degree conflates his abstract variables of the characteristics of the modern technological era, his description strikes me as rational, even if it becomes somewhat difficult to understand exactly what is causing what. Considering Jonas states a dialectic (or mutual feedback) system is at work here, then it makes sense what was at one time an end could become at a later time a means and there may never be a resolution (or ending). And this is exactly what Jonas proposes in describing the modern technological era. It is an era in which – unlike the pre-modern technological era – technology “tends not to approach an equilibrium or saturation point in the process of fitting means to ends” and thus in which there is no resolution (or end) at which vested interests may become conservative and disinclined toward innovation and its concomitant risks. At times, Jonas description seems to me to falter into fallacious circular reasoning, reasoning in which the absence of resolution and the perpetual mutual feedback of the system beget infinite advancement and continually opening perspectives; but, he also mentions other forces (or pressures) exist which he asserts influence the phenomenon of continual technological advancement or progress, progress which he notes is neither a “value term” nor a “neutral term,” but is a term describing “a case of the entropy-defying sort (organic evolution is another)” in which the “internal motion of the system, left to itself and not interfered with” naturally results in a later period being “superior” to a preceding period “in terms of technology itself” (Jonas, 1979/2014, chapter 20, part: I The formal dynamics of technology, section: Traits of modern technology, para. 1-2).
Completing his description of the “traditional” and the “modern” technological eras by delineating how those eras’ traits differ in their relations to time, catalysts, resolutions, ends and means, and progress, Jonas moves on to address directly what he views as the “motive forces” or “compulsive pressures” creating the unique characteristic of modern technology to continually progress. First, Jonas introduces some familiar forces such as the “pressure of competition” for ends such as profit, power, and security, as well as the “somewhat paradoxical” feeling people have even in materially abundant societies they must constantly act in order to get ahead. In addition to these forces some may consider unique to capitalist societies, Jonas notes other forces that would compel innovation even in socialist societies, forces such as population pressure or environmental emergencies that were themselves caused by technological progress (Jonas, 1979/2014, chapter 20, part: I The formal dynamics of technology, section: The nature of restless technology, para. 1-2). Jonas explains other forces and scenarios also, but near the end of this section of his essay, he asserts the common denominator of all these forces as the “premise that there can be indefinite progress because there is always something new and better to find” (Jonas, 1979/2014, chapter 20, part: I The formal dynamics of technology, section: The nature of restless technology, para. 4). According to Jonas, humans’ acceptance of this premise of the “virtual infinitude of advance” began in the modern technological era – founded on relatively valid evidence that “the nature of things and of human cognition” are essentially boundless – and distinguishes this era from the pre-modern one. Jonas states “the phenomenon of an exponentially growing generic innovation is qualitatively different” from innovation in the pre-modern technological era; and one must understand this “ontological-epistemological premise” if one is to grasp the fundamental “agent” of modern “technological dynamics” and thereby grasp also the “corollary conviction” that technology deriving from and suited to this boundless potential of nature and of cognition is itself boundless (Jonas, 1979/2014, chapter 20, part: I The formal dynamics of technology, section: The nature of restless technology, para. 4-6).
In the next section of his essay, Jonas proposes the main cause of what humans in the modern technological era perceive as an “intrinsic infinity” to progress is the “interaction of science and technology” that has resulted in a fundamentally different perspective on nature that has arisen since the middle of the nineteenth century when improved concepts and instruments began to enrich humans’ understanding of the natural world. Since Newton, according to Jonas, the natural world had been described by applying relatively simple natural laws to explain a wide variety of phenomena, but those applications offered few novel concepts. With improved instruments, however, humans developed a more penetrating understanding of the nuances of nature and of how more refined observations, measurements, and analyses could reveal greater complexity than had previously been imagined (Jonas, 1979/2014, chapter 20, part: I The formal dynamics of technology, section: Science as a source of restlessness, para. 1). Essentially, Jonas argues the human inclination toward scientific inquiry and knowledge creation (theory) spawns technological innovations (practice) that propels further knowledge creation that propels further technological innovations in a mutual feedback system resulting in progress. Still, Jonas acknowledges his explanations and extrapolations are to a certain degree “conjectural” and the future may reveal boundaries to scientific knowledge (Jonas, 1979/2014, chapter 20, part: I The formal dynamics of technology, section: Science as a source of restlessness, para. 1-3).
Jonas concludes the first part of his essay with two main points on what his views of knowledge and technology mean for the philosophy of technology. First, he proclaims the division between theory and practice has been bridged by technology; and although there was a time when the pursuit of knowledge itself was considered a noble end, that time has given way to one in which the pursuit of knowledge alone is deemed an insufficient end. In other words, Jonas states, “nobility has been exchanged for utility” and this “technological syndrome” has engendered a “socializing of the theoretical realm, enlisting it in the service of common need.” In Jonas’ view, this undoubtedly raises philosophical questions regarding an apparent change in human values and in what a concept such as “wisdom” now means (Jonas, 1979/2014, chapter 20, part: I The formal dynamics of technology, section: The philosophical implications, para. 1-2). Second, he proclaims that the grandeur of the technological “enterprise” with its promise of worldly power and infinite advancement has allowed it to “establish itself as the transcendent end” and to inform the collective human mind in the modern technological era with a hunger to become “masters of the world” (Jonas, 1979/2014, chapter 20, part: I The formal dynamics of technology, section: The philosophical implications, para. 3).
With his overview of the two main technological eras and his description of how the characteristics of those two eras differ in their relations to certain variables, Jonas completes part one of his essay, which as a whole, is clearly concerned with the overall situation, forces, and enterprise comprising the technological realms of the traditional and modern technological eras.
In part two of his essay, Jonas addresses the objects of technology of which he says there are two: the technological artifacts (objects or means) and the purposes (objectives or ends) to which those artifacts are applied (Jonas, 1979/2014, chapter 20, part: II The material works of technology, section: introduction, par. 1). Jonas’ analysis in part two also distinguishes between some eras in which the objects and objectives of technology are different: the mechanical era, the chemical era, the electrical era, the electronic (or communication-information) era, and the biological era. My impression of Jonas’ main points in part two of the essay are: 1) Advancement through these eras in terms of both the means and ends of technology in general have progressed along a continuum from the more concrete (or natural) to the more abstract (or artificial); 2) The development of technology as objects (or means) and as objectives (or ends) can be divided into phases or categories in which humans may essentially harness or re-configure existing natural elements (e.g. to build and power mechanical or electrical machines that improve production efficiency or living conditions or save human labor), in which humans may create new materials by altering elemental natural patterns (e.g. to create synthetic chemicals to attack microorganisms), in which humans may use recently created technologies to create technologies that produce data or information which machines (or technologies) themselves may process and apply to some even more abstract purpose (e.g. systems of predictive analytics that may provide suggestions to consumers that result in customer satisfaction, in higher sales for companies, and in higher profits for shareholders), and in which humans may use technology upon humans to re-design either themselves or others into more suitable or desirable forms; and, finally, 3) The introduction of modern technology includes the introduction of previously non-existent and increasingly artificial “technological apparatus” of machines and infrastructure (or matrix, so to speak) in which humans are embedded and from which it would be almost impossible to extricate themselves (Jonas, 1979/2014, chapter 20, part: II The material works of technology, section: New kinds of commodities, par. 1-10, section: The last stage of the revolution?, par. 1-2).
At more than one point in the first two parts of his discussion concerning the dynamics and the content of technology, Jonas has noted that human introduction and acceptance of technology has raised issues concerning both the means and ends of technology which require philosophical (i.e. metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical) attention. In the final part of this work, Jonas addresses some of these issues and asserts clearly the human role as “prime agent” (Jonas, 1979/2014, chapter 20, part: III Toward an ethics of technology, section: introduction, par. 2) creating and bearing responsibility for the results of these issues, obvious issues such as potential ecological disaster (e.g. by nuclear warfare or accident) as well as subtle issues such as what should be the collective ideal (or image) of the future human (e.g. immortal human-machine hybrid or mortal Homo sapiens sapiens) or to what degree should humans mobilize to overcome the apparent determinism inherent in the evolution of the technological enterprise, a mobilization that would be contingent upon humans exercising what Jonas calls their “most troublesome gift: the spontaneity of human acting which confounds all prediction” (Jonas, 1979/2014, chapter 20, part: III Toward an ethics of technology, section: Problematic preconditions of an effective ethics, par. 10) and which – if by spontaneity he means freedom – he has already stated probably has been reduced at least at the individual level due to humans’ dependence on the technological matrix they have created and accepted (Jonas, 1979/2014, chapter 20, part: III Toward an ethics of technology, section: Problematic preconditions of an effective ethics, par. 2).